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Constituional Law - Intra-Siate Produced and Consumed
Wheat Under the Commerce Clause
The defendant, who operates a farm in Oklahoma, was notified
by the County Committee authorized to administer marketing
quotas for wheat under the provisions of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 19381 that his farm wheat acreage allotment for 1956
was 0 acres, that his excess acreage of wheat was 43 acres, and
that his farm marketing excess-upon which a civil penalty ap-
plies-was 473 bushels. Following defendant's refusal to pay the
penalty of $506.11 thus incurred, the United States brought action
to recover this penalty. Defendant alleged, by way of affirmative
defenses, that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 is uncon-
stitutional and the conditions precedent to valid establishment
of a wheat acreage allotment for defendant's farm had not been
complied with. At the trial, defendant's evidence did not contro-
vert the complaint's factual allegations, but defendant testified
that he had used all of his farm marketing excess wheat as feed
for livestock subsequently marketed in the State of Oklahoma.
The district court ruled only on the constitutional question raised
by the defendant. It held that the Commerce Clause2 does not
empower Congress to regulate production of wheat which is used
as feed on the farm and that the defendant was therefore entitled
to judgment.3 The case was reversed without opinion by the
United States Supreme Court.4
On its facts, the instant case is nearly identical to Wickard v.
Filburn which held that the provisions of the Agricultural Ad-
1 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, § 1 et seq. as amended 52 Stat.
31, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. The suit was specifically instituted under
52 Stat. 66, 7 U.S.C. § 1376 to collect civil penalties, according to
communication from W. B. West III, United States Attorney. The
opinion erroneously states the action was brought under the Agri-
cultural Marketing Act of 1946 § 202 et seq., 60 Stat. 1087, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1621 et seq.
2 United States Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
3 United States v. Haley, 166 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Tex. 1958).
4 Order 587 Per Curiam, 27 L. Week 3235 (1959).
G 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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justment Act of 1938 imposing civil penalties on the farm mar-
keting excess of wheat are within the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause even though the wheat is wholly consumed
on the farm. A major difference in the two cases is that in the
Wickard case, the farmer, who was seeking to enjoin collection
of the penalty, stipulated that his wheat, kept and fed on the farm,
affected interstate commerce and that all the farm-consumed wheat
in the United States amounted to over one fifth of the national
production. The court accepted this as an intrastate market of
such weight that, if unregulated, would have sufficient strength
to defeat the interstate market trends in volume and in price. In
the instant case there was no stipulation that the defendant's wheat
affected interstate commerce and there was no proof offered by
the government to show an effect on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court's reversal of the instant case solely on
the authority of Wickard makes activity in the area of agriculture,
not in or affecting interstate commerce, subject to control by the
Federal Government, a result that earlier courts viewed with
alarm.6 Fields in which the Court has reversed earlier stands to
bring a particular activity within the ambit of interstate commerce
include refining of sugar,7 livestock commission men at stockyards,"
mining of coal,9 insurance, 10 petroleum sales," shipment of goods
6 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922); Hammer v. Dag-
enhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895); Schecter Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
7 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) holding sugar
refiner not within Anti Trust Act. Contra, Mandeville Island and
Farms v. American Crystan Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) holding
sugar refiner within Sherman Act.
s Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). Contra, Tagg Bros.
& Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1934).
9 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Heisler v. Thomas Col-
liery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). Contra, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940): Cf. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,
262 U.S. 172 (1923) holding iron mining not to be in interstate com-
merce.
10 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869). Contra, United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Polish National
Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S. 725 (1944).
11 United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41 (1870). Contra, Federal Power
Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 572 (1934).
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produced by child labor,1 2 and dealing in contracts.13 Among in-
consistencies that have occured is a 1919 case 1 4 holding a cook,
who prepared meals for bridge carpenters who maintained rail-
road bridges, engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the
Federal Employers Liability Act while a 1943 decision 15 held a
cook, who cooked for maintenance-of-way men on a railroad, out-
side of the interstate commerce clause for purposes of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the recent decisions holding major league
baseball clubs not within the Sherman Act 16 while football play-
ers17 and boxing' s are held within the Sherman Act. That the
Supreme Court still recognizes a line between activities Congress
can reach through the Commerce Clause is apparent in the build-
ing maintenance worker cases' 9 and a case holding taxi cabs that
take passengers from their homes to the Chicago railroad station
not to be in interstate commerce.20
De minimis non curat lex does not thwart the power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed a
decision of the court of appeals which had applied the maxim to
exclude a newspaper from the Fair Labor Standards Act that sold
12 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), expressly overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
13 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (1850). Contra, North American Co.
v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
14 Philadelphia B. & W. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 250 U.S. 101 (1919).
1G McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943).
16 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); fol-
lowed in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The
court distinguished Federal Baseball in the later case by saying the
earlier decision held that baseball was not intended by Congress to
be covered by the Sherman Act.
17 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1956). Cf. United
States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) holding business of producing,
booking, and presenting legitimate theatrical attractions in interstate
commerce within the Sherman Act.
Is International Boxing Club v. United States, 258 U.S. 342 (1959).
19 Borden Company v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945) and Martino v.
Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946) holding main-
tenance workers on buildings which house concerns engaged in in-
terstate commerce within the Fair Labor Standards Act. Contra,
10 East 40th Street Building Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945) hold-
ing maintenance workers on a building housing tenants, part of whom
are and part are not engaged in occupations necessary for the pro-
duction of goods in interstate commerce not within the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
20 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
1050
NOTES
one half of one per cent of its papers (40 copies) out of the state.21
The newspaper case varied significantly from the Wickard case
or the instant case since the government had to prove that papers
entered commerce and affected commerce regardless of how trif-
ling the infraction might be considered.
The Supreme Court has perhaps gone the farthest to extend
federal control in the agricultural area. A 1939 case2 2 upholding
the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to fix the price of milk
paid a farmer before his milk entered commerce was broadened
by a 1942 decision 23 in which the federal milk orders were held
applicable to a completely intrastate dairy that purchased and sold
all of its milk within the borders of Illinois. Maintenance em-
ployees of a non-profit ditch company whose sole activity was the
collection, storage and distribution to farmers of water for irriga-
tion which might raise products which might enter commerce
have been held subject to Congressional control within the Fair
Labor Standards Act,24 even though the act excludes agricultural
laborers.
Though the Wickard case,2 5 earlier followed without question,2 3
may have imposed the current far-reaching definition of interstate
commerce first upon agriculture, there is evidence that the un-
limited definition has also touched other areas of activity. The
sale of sulfathiazole tablets six months after they had been brought
into the state and had passed through the hands of a wholesaler
to a retailer have been held within the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.27 Employees of an architect who drew plans for
facilities that may be used for interstate commerce have also been
held engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the Fair
21 Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946).
22 United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
23 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
24 Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949).
25 Note 5 supra.
26 United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1957); Donaldson
v. United States, 285 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3rd Cir. 1958), certiorari denied, 356 U.S.
958 (1957); United States v. Mumma, 237 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir. 1956),
certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 1003 (1956); Shafer v. United States, 229
F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1956), certiorari denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1955), all
rejecting the contention that the farm-marketing excess provisions
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 are not within the federal
commerce power in reliance upon Wickard v. Filburn.
27 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
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Labor Standards Act,28 and a small town bakery operation in com-
petition with another small town baker, one of several corporations
having interlocking ownership and management of other corpo-
rations engaged in interstate business, has been held to be within
the Clayton Act and the Robinson Patman Act.2 9
The Supreme Court's refusal to re-examine the Wickard case
lends credence to a contention that the Court has discarded all
semblance of the literal meaning of interstate commerce in favor
of an econoic definition applied to a situation where Congress de-
termines that a volume of possible small quantities of a product
may reach and impede interstate commerce. The decision also
supports a theory that "commerce . . . among the several States"
in the 18th Century context meant commerce among individuals
within the state.30
Roger A. Langenheim '60
28 Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
29 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
30 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 83 (1953).
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